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September 14, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
and ROSENTHAL, 
,  
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(Filed: September 19, 2012) 
 
 
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________ 
                                                 
* The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the Southern District 
of Texas, sitting by designation. 
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PER CURIAM 
 This is the third appeal by Edwin Michael Brown from his conviction and 
sentence.  A jury convicted Brown for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-
trafficking offense (Count 1); distributing and possessing crack cocaine and heroin with 
the intent to distribute (Count 2); and possessing a firearm after a felony conviction 
(Count 3).  The District Court sentenced Brown to an aggregate prison term of 324 
months, consisting of 240 months for the drug-trafficking conviction, to be served 
concurrent with 120 months on the felon-in-possession conviction and consecutive to 84 
months for the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) firearm conviction.  This court affirmed the conviction 
and sentence on direct appeal and affirmed the District Court’s denial of Brown’s motion 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  He now appeals from the District Court’s order granting his 
motion for a sentence reduction on Count 2 under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) and Amendment 
750 to the Sentencing Guidelines.1
Brown’s § 3582(c)(2) motion asked the District Court to reduce the sentence for 
Count 2, the drug count, from 240 to 192 months.  The District Court reduced it to 189 
months, which lowered Brown’s aggregate sentence from 324 to 273 months.  Both the 
  
                                                 
1 Amendment 750 amended the Sentencing Guidelines in accordance with the Fair 
Sentencing Act (“FSA”), which modified the statutory penalties for crack offenses by reducing 
the crack-to-powder cocaine sentencing ratio from 100:1 to approximately 18:1.  See United 
States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 196–97 (3d Cir. 2011). Amendment 750, which amended the 
Guidelines in accordance with the FSA, became both effective and retroactive on November 1, 
2011.  See U.S.S.G. app. C., amends. 750, 759 (Supp. Nov. 1, 2011). 
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original and the reduced sentences were in the middle of the applicable Guidelines 
ranges.   
 Brown appeals the District Court’s order granting his motion for a reduced 
sentence on the basis that it failed to address specific § 3553(a) factors, particularly 
Brown’s post-sentencing conduct.  Brown did not specifically ask the court to consider 
this mitigating factor when he filed his § 3582(c) motion.  The addendum to the 
presentence report pointed out that he had one disciplinary incident in prison, had taken 
courses, and had paid part of his criminal financial penalty.  Brown asserts that because 
the District Court did not adequately explain its reasons for the extent of the sentence 
reduction, this court cannot evaluate the District Court’s exercise of discretion.  Brown 
asks this court to order a limited remand for the District Court to explain its reasons.  We 
are not persuaded.2
 The District Court’s order granting Brown’s motion was on a form generated by 
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts for efficient disposition of 
sentence-reduction motions under § 3582(c)(2).
 
3
                                                 
2 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  When a district court grants 
a motion for resentencing under § 3582(c)(2), the resulting sentence is reviewed under the abuse of discretion 
standard.  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). 
  The order stated that Brown’s motion 
was granted after “having considered such motion and taking into account the policy 
statement set forth at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable.”  Although a District Court must 
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consider the § 3553(a) factors and the relevant Guidelines policy statements when 
exercising its discretion under § 3582(c)(2) to reduce a sentence, “we presume, in the 
absence of record evidence suggesting otherwise, that a [district] judge has faithfully 
discharged her duty to consider” relevant factors.  See United States v. Fernandez, 443 
F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2006).  Brown points to no evidence that the District Court failed to 
consider relevant factors.  Indeed, such consideration is evident in the record.  The 
District Court’s oral sentence at the November 20, 2006 hearing, after allocution and 
argument, explained the analysis of the relevant § 3553(a) factors.  The court stated that 
in deciding to impose a sentence at the middle of the Guidelines range, it took into 
account the seriousness of the offense — a “long-term drug trafficking operation” that 
took place “24 hours a day” and involved weapons, making it “as serious as a drug case 
can get”; Brown’s youth and long drug involvement; and the powder/crack cocaine 
disparity.  
 Brown’s argument that, in the § 3582(c)(2) sentence-reduction proceeding, the 
District Court was required to give an explicit analysis of specific § 3553(a) factors, 
including post-sentencing rehabilitation, lacks support in the case law as well as in the 
record.  The Supreme Court has stated that when resentencing a felon after an appellate 
remand, a district judge is entitled to consider rehabilitation during incarceration.  See 
generally Pepper v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1229 (2011).  But Pepper 
                                                                                                                                                             
3AO 247 (Rev. 11/1) Order Regarding Motion for Sentence Reduction Pursuant to 18 
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applies to resentencing, at which the district judge must discuss every substantial 
argument advanced by the defendant.  A sentence-reduction proceeding under § 
3582(c)(2) is not a form of resentencing.  Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. ––––, 130 
S.Ct. 2683, 2690–92 (2010).  It is instead a summary procedure designed to implement a 
change in the Sentencing Guidelines.  In this case, the District Court implemented that 
change and imposed a reduced sentence that was otherwise consistent with the original 
sentence, which it had explained in the original sentencing hearing.  Neither the amended 
Guidelines, § 3582(c)(2), nor Dillon, require a district judge to give effect to events that 
may have occurred after the original sentencing, such as consideration of post-sentencing 
rehabilitation or good conduct.    
 Other circuits faced with similar arguments and records have held that it is not 
error for the District Court to use a summary order in ruling on a § 3582(c) sentence-
reduction motion.  See, e.g., United States v. Batista, 2012 WL 1738965 (2d Cir. May 17, 
2012); United States v. Tapps, 2011 WL 835752, at *1 (7th Cir. March 10, 2011).  The 
cases Brown cites, United States v. Howard, 644 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2011), and, United 
States v. Marion, 590 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2009), involved orders denying motions for 
reduced sentences under § 3582(c)(2), not orders granting motions, which raise different 
concerns.  See, e.g., United States v. Hargrave, 428 Fed. Appx. 388, 389 (5th Cir. 2011) 
                                                                                                                                                             
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).   
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(“When a district court summarily grants a § 3582(c) motion, the court is not required to 
give reasons for its decision.”).   
There are cases in which the District Court granted a § 3582(c)(2) motion but the 
appellate court found the order to be so ambiguous as to preclude meaningful review.  
See, e.g., United States v. Burrell, 622 F.3d 961, 964 (8th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the 
district court’s failure to explain its reasons for reducing the prison term to the top of the 
amended Guidelines range required a limited remand, when the original sentence was in 
the middle of the range).  This is not such a case.  The record shows the District Court’s 
consideration of the relevant factors and the rationale for its § 3582(c)(2) ruling.  The 
reduced sentence is within the amended range and is consistent with the original 
sentence, revised to implement the retroactive Guidelines amendment.   
 We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the District Court’s order resentencing 
Brown.    
